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Abstract 
 
Psychologists recognise various forms of anxiety, such as generalized anxiety disorder, separation anxiety and social phobia. 
People who stutter are at risk of elevated levels of anxiety, especially social phobia. Recent research has suggested that anxiety 
may be caused and maintained by cognitive biases such as preferentially allocating attention towards threat stimuli. These biases 
can be re-trained using cognitive bias modification with resulting improvements in levels of anxiety. 
In the present study, we measured different forms of anxiety and attentional bias for faces among 8-18 year olds attending the 
Michael Palin Centre for treatment for stuttering. The clients and their parent(s) completed the child and parent versions, 
respectively, of the Screen for Childhood Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED), which provides an overall anxiety 
score and sub-scores, with clinical cut-offs, for generalized anxiety disorder, separation anxiety, social phobia , school avoidance 
and panic. The clients also performed a computerised measure of attentional bias for faces, using schematic stimuli.  
Levels of anxiety were higher than in the general population, and prevalence increased with age. There was a significant 
correlation between SCARED scores produced by clients and their parents. Socially anxious participants showed a bias towards 
sad faces. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of ODC 2014. 
Keywords:Stuttering; anxiety; cognitive bias. 
1. Introduction 
Clinical psychologists distinguish between various forms of anxiety (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). For example, in social phobia (also known as social anxiety disorder) the anxiety is focused on situations 
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where the individual may be evaluated by others, often when social interaction is involved. Separation anxiety 
involves fear of being away from home or apart from people to whom the individual is emotionally attached. School 
avoidance refers to refusal to attend school due to emotional distress. Generalised anxiety disorder may affect a wide 
range of situations. The anxiety may be accompanied by panic/somatic symptoms such as blushing, sweating or 
elevated heart rate. 
The relationship between stuttering and anxiety has long been debated. In a recent systematic review and 
meta-analysis, Craig &Tran (2014) found that, relative to people who do not stutter, adults with chronic stuttering 
experience significantly elevated levels of anxiety, especially social anxiety. They argued that these differences 
result from the negative effects of stuttering across the lifespan, probably beginning in childhood (see, for example, 
Blood & Blood, 2007; Davis, Howell & Cook, 2003; Langevin, Packman & Onslow, 2009). Smith, Iverach, 
O’Brian, Kefalianos & Reilly (2014) reviewed published research into risk factors for anxiety in children and 
adolescents who stutter. They pointed out that it is clinically important to identify the typical age of onset of anxiety 
disorders in this client group, but concluded, on the basis of their review, that there is currently insufficient evidence 
to permit this.  
Carrying out anxiety research with children and young people can be challenging: they may have poor 
insight into their own level of anxiety, or might be affected by demand characteristics (e.g., reporting high levels of 
anxiety because they believe that this is what the researcher wants them to do) or perceptions of societal norms (e.g., 
boys may feel that admitting to their anxiety could be seen as a sign of weakness).Gunn, Menzies, O’Brian, Onslow, 
Packman, Lowe, Iverach, Heard  Block (2014) stressed the importance of gaining confirmatory reports about 
anxiety from others, for example, parents. 
Many studies with people who do not stutter have indicated that people with high or clinical levels of 
anxiety are biased in their cognitive processing (Clark & Wells, 1995; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards & Mathews, 
1991; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).This bias may manifest itself in a number of ways. It may affect the way that the 
individual allocates attention: while non-anxious people automatically direct their attention away from negative 
stimuli such as disapproving faces or threat words (e.g. attending preferentially to the word feature rather than 
failure), anxious individuals show attentional bias towards such stimuli (e.g. Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004). Interpretation bias occurs 
when the individual tends to select a negative interpretation of ambiguous stimuli or events (for example, the 
laughter of others is seen as a signal of derision directed at the anxious person, rather than enjoyment: Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000). These biases are believed to cause and maintain anxiety. Biases have been demonstrated in 
children and young people as well as adults. Weissman, Chu, Reddy & Mohlman (2012) used schematic faces to 
investigate attentional bias, and found that anxious 8-18 year olds allocated  attention preferentially to schematic 
faces displaying negative expressions.  
 
Recent research has focused on cognitive bias modification (CBM) interventions which automatically re-
train the biases and thereby reduce levels of anxiety (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Attentional bias modification, in 
which participants learn to allocate attention in a way that is less maladaptive, has been used successfully to treat 
social phobia in adults (Schmidt, Richey, Buckner & Timpano, 2009). Interpretation bias modification, which uses 
ambiguous vignettes to train people to select positive interpretations, has been used to treat anxiety and stress, and 
may even be effective when used in advance of threatening situations to reduce their impact on the individual: 
Woud, Postma, Holmes & Mackintosh (2013) found that when participants were given interpretation bias 
modification prior to exposure to an extremely distressing film, they were less likely to experience disturbing 
intrusive thoughts subsequently.   
Lowe, Guastella, Chen, Menzies, Packman, O'Brian & Onslow (2012) carried out an eye movement study 
to investigate the way that adults who stutter deploy visual attention while processing facial expressions delivered 
via a TV screen. In their study, participants who stuttered displayed attentional bias: compared with controls who 
did not stutter, they looked less at the TV display overall and, in particular, spent less time looking at positive facial 
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expressions than other expressions or the background of the TV display. However, contrary to predictions based on 
previous research, those who stuttered did not show a bias towards negative facial expressions. In their discussion, 
Lowe et al. highlighted the need for studies examining attentional bias for faces in people who stutter and who have 
high or low levels of social anxiety. 
The present study was designed to investigate (i) the prevalence of different forms of anxiety among a 
clinical sample of 8-18 year olds who stutter; (ii) the extent to which these young clients and their parents agreed in 
their reporting of clients’ anxiety; and (iii) the association between anxiety and cognitive (attentional) bias in these 
young clients. 
2. Method 
The participants were 8-18 years old attending assessment sessions at the Michael Palin Centre. Ethics 
permission for the study was given by the NRES Committee East of England – Hertfordshire. 
Anxiety was assessed with the 41-item Screen for Childhood Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED) 
(Birmaher et al., 1999), a freely-available child and parent self-report instrument used to screen for childhood 
anxiety disorders. It consists of 41 items and 5 factors that parallel the DSM-IV classification of anxiety disorders, 
with a cut-off figure indicating likely clinical problems on this factor: panic/somatic (cut-off score = 7), generalized 
anxiety disorder (9), separation anxiety (5), social phobia (8) and school avoidance (3). In addition, a total score of 
25 or above is considered to indicate the need for further clinical investigation. The child and parent versions of the 
SCARED have moderate parent-child agreement and good internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and 
discriminant validity, and the instrument is sensitive to treatment response. Severity of symptoms for the past three 
months is rated using a 0- to 2-point rating scale with 0 meaning ‘not true or hardly ever true’, 1 meaning 
‘sometimes true’, and 2 meaning ‘true or often true’. Reliability and validity of the measure have been demonstrated 
via several studies. The parent and child versions each take approximately 10 minutes to complete. The parent 
version is similar to the version completed by the child except that it replaces I and my with your child or your 
child’s.The client and at least one parent completed the appropriate version of the SCARED. Completion of the 
assessment by young participants was supervised by their clinician. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1.Schematic showing the probe detection task (neutral, happy, angry, sad) 
 
Attentional bias was measured using a computer task based on that described by Weissman et al. (2012). The task 
employed the face stimuli shown in Figure 1and consisted of a number of trials; the sequence of events on a trial is 
illustrated in Figure 2.  The participant sat before a computer screen at a distance of approximately 20 inches. A 
fixation cross was displayed in the centre of the screen for 500 ms and was then replaced by a pair of faces, 
represented as schematic line drawings, which were also displayed for 500 ms. When the faces disappeared, a probe 
(an upward-pointing or downward-pointing arrow) appeared at the location previously occupied by one of the faces. 
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The participant pressed a button to indicate whether they saw the upward-pointing or downward-pointing arrow, and 
reaction times and accuracy were recorded. The fixation cross then appeared, signaling the start of the next trial. On 
the 20 practice trials, both faces displayed a neutral facial expression. Each practice trial was followed by feedback 
to indicate whether the participant correctly identified the probe. On the 96 randomly-ordered experimental trials, 
one face displayed a neutral expression and the other an emotionally valenced expression – anger (32 trials), 
happiness (32 trials) or sadness (32 trials). Relative position of the faces, position and orientation of the probe, and 
the expression of the face it replaced were counterbalanced. The computer task took approximately 7 minutes to 
complete. 
 
Fig. 2. Schematic showing the sequence of events in the probe detection task 
 
Bias scores were calculated for each participant. These relied on the concept of congruent and incongruent 
trials for each of the three emotion types (angry, happy, sad). On all experimental trials there was one emotion face 
(angry, happy, sad) and one neutral face; a congruent trial was one where the arrow probe replaced the emotion face, 
and an incongruent trial was one where the probe replaced the neutral face. A participant’s bias score was the result 
of subtracting the mean congruent value from the mean incongruent value. A positive bias score (i.e., congruent 
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trials are faster) indicates bias towards that emotion, and a negative bias score (congruent trials are slower) indicates 
bias away from that emotion.  
3. Results  
Thirty five children (8-11 years old; mean age 9.9 years, s.d. 1.07) and 33 young people (12-18 years old; mean 
age 14.22 years, s.d. 1.73) took part in the study.   
 
Table 1 shows the frequency of occurrence of the different forms of anxiety. Following Birmaher et al. (2009), 
results are presented separately for those aged 12-18 years and younger participants. All forms of anxiety apart from 
separation anxiety increased with age. Separation anxiety was more common in participants under 12 years of age, 
and decreased with age.  The age difference was only statistically significant for generalized anxiety disorder (χ² = 
9.76, df = 1, p = 0.002) and separation anxiety (χ² = 3.90, df = 1, p = 0.048).  
 
Table 1. Percentage of participants at or above cutoff for SCARED scales. 
SCARED Scale Under 12 (n=35) 12-18 years (n=33) All ages (N=68) 
Grand total 28.6 42.4 35.3 
Panic/Somatic 25.7 39.4 32.4 
Generalized anxiety disorder   5.7 36.4 20.6 
Separation anxiety 40.0 18.2 29.4 
Social phobia 22.9 36.4 29.4 
School avoidance 14.3 27.3 20.6 
 
In total, 67 mothers and 47 fathers completed the parental SCARED questionnaire about the clients’ anxiety. 
Mothers’ scores correlated significantly with their child’s score and with the father’s score for all anxiety categories, 
whereas fathers’ scores correlated significantly with their child’s only for separation anxiety, social phobia and 
school avoidance (see Table 2). Agreement between mothers and clients in terms of classification (anxious or non-
anxious) ranged from 68.7% to 77.6%, and between fathers and clients from 60.4% to 81.3%. 
 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients for SCARED scores from different respondents. 
SCARED Scale Mum & client Dad & client Mum & Dad 
Grand total .516** .248 .707** 
Panic/Somatic .385** .001 .338* 
Generalized anxiety disorder .381** .111 .452** 
Separation anxiety .498** .412** .639** 
Social phobia .520** .311* .767** 
School avoidance .586** .319* .490** 
  **p<.01 *p<.05 
 
Table 3 shows the mean bias scores for angry, happy and sad emotion faces. Only trials on which the participant 
made the correct response to the arrow probe were included. As noted above, a positive value indicates a bias 
towards that emotion, and a negative value indicates a bias away from the emotion.  
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Table 3. Mean bias scores for angry, happy and sad emotional stimuli. 
SCARED Scale Angry  Happy  Sad 
Grand total         
Below cutoff -10.1  -1.9  -17.5 
At or above cutoff 16.1  6.7  4.1 
Panic/Somatic         
Below cutoff -7.2  -2.4  -12.7 
At or above cutoff 11.0  8.1  -5.1 
Generalized anxiety disorder         
Below cutoff -1.2  -0.3  -14.7 
At or above cutoff -2.4  6.9  9.7 
Separation anxiety         
Below cutoff 2.9  1.7  -4.8 
At or above cutoff -12.8  -1.0  -24.9 
Social phobia         
Below cutoff 2.8  -3.3  -19.5 
At or above cutoff -11.8  11.5  12.3 
School avoidance         
Below cutoff 0.2  1.0  -12.0 
At or above cutoff -8.5  0.9  -2.6 
 
 
Analysis using MANOVA indicated that the only SCARED scale that yielded a significant difference in terms of 
bias scores was the social phobia scale (F [1,64]=3.077, p=.034); only the contrast for the sad stimuli was 
statistically significant (p=.010). 
 
4. Discussion  
 
The first aim of the present study was to investigate the point prevalence of different types of anxiety in a sample 
of children and young people attending clinic for an assessment of their stuttering, with a view to treatment. The 
results suggest that a high percentage of this client group may experience anxiety disorders, and particularly in the 
12-18 age group. In the general population of adolescents, the lifetime prevalence of the forms of anxiety explored 
here ranges from 2.2% to 9.1% (Merikangas, He, Burstein, Swanson, Avenevoli, Cui, Benjet, Georgiades & 
Swendsen, 2010), much lower percentages than are reported here. Point prevalence (the proportion of a population 
experiencing a condition at any given time) is by definition lower than lifetime prevalence (the percentage of a 
population experiencing the condition at any time in their lives), and therefore it may be speculated that among 
children and young people attending stuttering therapy, the lifetime prevalence of anxiety will be many times greater 
than that found in the general population.  
Recent research into anxiety and stuttering has been heavily focused on the relationship between stuttering and 
social anxiety disorder (social phobia).  It is clear from these findings that young people who stutter also exhibit 
high levels of other anxiety disorders. Of particular note is the high level of separation anxiety in the younger group 
of participants. This might be expected given the difficulty that these children have communicating, though it is no 
longer evident in the older group. By contrast, social phobia was more common in the older group, although the 
percentage of adolescents in this study with social phobia (36.4%) was lower than that reported by Gunn et al., 
(2014) who found that 50% of a sample of a similar age could be diagnosed with social phobia using the Diagnostic 
Interview Schedule for Children.   
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This is a cross-sectional study which compares the incidence of anxiety in clients seeking therapy for stuttering 
across two age groups.  A longitudinal study of anxiety through childhood and adolescence would provide greater 
insight into the development of anxiety across the ages.  For instance, it is not possible to determine from the current 
study whether it is the children who exhibit separation anxiety in early adolescence who go on to exhibit behaviours 
consistent with social anxiety at a later age. Neither is it possible to identify whether it is possible to identify which 
children who stutter are at greater risk of experiencing high levels of anxiety of one form or another. 
The second aim of this study was to explore the extent to which these young people and their parents agree in 
their reporting of clients’ anxiety. Gunn et al. (2014) suggest that adolescents have a tendency to provide a more 
positive view of themselves than is the reality and so recommend that self-report anxiety measures provided by 
children and young people need to be corroborated by others, e.g. parents. In the present study, parental SCARED 
scores correlated highly with those of their children, suggesting that parents, particularly mothers, are sensitive to 
their children’s anxiety. The high correlation also indicates that data obtained from adolescents who stutter 
themselves is reliable in relation to the presence of anxiety. 
The third aim of this study was to explore the association between anxiety and cognitive (attentional) bias in 
these young clients.  Much recent research has indicated that anxiety disorders are characterized by attentional bias 
towards threat stimuli such as negative facial expressions (e.g. Weissman et al., 2012). The present study explored 
attentional bias by using schematic facial stimuli in a probe detection task. Compared with non-anxious participants, 
those with SCARED scores indicating social phobia were significantly biased towards negative (sad) facial 
expressions. This is consistent with Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) model of social anxiety which considers that 
people with social anxiety pay greater attention to faces with negative affect. 
There are various clinical implications that could be drawn from these findings.  It is clear that there are some 
children who stutter who experience clinical levels of anxiety which may be associated with or independent of their 
stuttering.  Therefore, clinicians need to consider this possibility within the assessment process and as part of 
therapy and be aware of the differing ways in which anxiety is experienced.  Helping a child to manage their anxiety 
will be a critical part of the therapy process. Further, being able to identify those who may be at risk of later social 
anxiety or other anxiety disorder would support a focus on prevention and early intervention. There are a number of 
therapy programmes that include the management of the cognitive-affective aspects of the disorder, but the finding 
that adolescents with social phobia were significantly biased towards negative (sad) facial expressions might 
indicate that attentional bias modification could be an additional therapy worth exploring with this client group. 
Interpretation bias modification has also been effective in reducing maladaptive reactions to negative experiences in 
adults (Woud et al., 2013), and has even been shown to be effective when used pre-emptively. Further exploration of 
the link between social phobia and cognitive bias in people who stutter may lead to effective forms of intervention 
using cognitive bias modification.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
This study has demonstrated that a clinical population of 12-18-year olds who stutter exhibits higher than 
expected levels of anxiety.  The findings also demonstrate that there are differences in the types of anxiety 
experienced by younger and older clients.  Younger clients who stutter were more likely to experience separation 
anxiety, while the older group were more likely to experience generalized anxiety disorder.  Compared with non-
anxious participants, those with high levels of social anxiety exhibited attentional bias towards negative (sad) 
schematic faces. A longitudinal study would help to shed light on the development of anxiety through childhood and 
adolescence and to determine whether there are risk factors that would help identify those children who stutter who 
are at risk of developing clinically significant levels of anxiety. 
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